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Abstract
This paper approaches multi-agent system programming with dialogue
games allowing the semantics of communicative acts to be a component in
multi-agent architectures. We present a dialogue game for enquiry enabling
agents to answer questions in a distributed fashion. In addition, we propose
a reasoning game that defines when agents are allowed to make decisions, in
the current case, decisions to accept to believe propositions. These games
are brought together in a deliberation cycle and are implemented in Prolog.
1 Introduction
This paper proposes a programming approach for multi-agent system (MAS) de-
velopment in which distributed problem solving emerges from communication and
reasoning protocols. This approach provides relief for developers from develop-
ing questioning, inquiring and answering processes allowing them, for example, to
focus on knowledge acquisition and representation issues.
FIPA proposed ACLs in which the semantics of communicative acts are spec-
ified with pre and post-conditions. Our semantics is similar; however, with the
difference that the post-conditions define how the listener perceives the speaker,
and not what the actual state of the speaker is. Other approaches include goal
directed agent programming in 3APL; our approach does not use goals but in-
stead unbalanced cognitive states to motivate communication. We contribute to
the MAS development, reasoning and communication protocols.
In Section 2, the agent’s cognitive state (CS) is given and a deliberation cycle
is provided stating when communication and reasoning is to be done. Next, dia-
logue games and reasoning games are presented that define, given the agent’s CS,
whether communicative acts are allowed to be uttered (Section 3) or decisions to
be made (Section 4). In the current paper, communicative acts are about question
handling, and decisions are about deciding to believe propositions. These games
are to a certain extent independent of the agents’ specification. In Section 5,
conclusions and a sketch of the implementation are given.
2 Agent Programming with Games
2.1 The Agent’s Cognitive State
An agent’s cognitive state (CS) consists of a finite number of mental states, which
are theories of multi-valued logic1. For our current needs it is sufficient to know
that theories are sets of propositions; see [3] for a formal specification. We will
not present a full repertoire of all possible mental states agents have regarding
themselves and others; only those are identified that are used in the present paper.
In the remainder, set A denotes the set of agent identifiers.
Agent x’s private belief state is denoted Bx; ψ ∈ Bx states that x believes
proposition ψ. An agent x’s private desire to believeDxBx is the set of propositions
that x desires to believe; ψ ∈ DxBx states that x desires that it believes ψ. BxBy is
the set of manifested beliefs of y that x is aware of; ψ ∈ BxBy states that x is aware
that y believes ψ. An agent can be aware of other agents’ desires; ψ ∈ BxDyBy
states that x is aware that y desires to believe ψ. Manifested ignorance state BxIy
is the set of propositions that x is aware that y does not believe; ψ ∈ BxIy states
that x is aware that y does not believe ψ. In addition, higher-order manifested
mental states are defined likewise, e.g. BxByBx, BxByIx; for manifested desires
we use BxByDxBx and BxByBxDyBy.
2.2 Deliberation Cycle
An agent consists of its CS and a deliberation cycle that describes when changes
are made to its CS. The deliberation cycle contains three choices and the execution
of five rules. See Figure 1 for a graphical depiction.
Step 1. Choose an applicable reasoning rule and go to step 2 to execute this rule.
If there are no applicable rules, go to step 4 to check whether communicative acts
have been received.
Step 2. Execute the selected reasoning rule from step 1. Note that execution of
reasoning rules does not have observable effects for other agents. Go to step 3 to
update the agent’s CS accordingly.
Step 3. Execute the appropriate update rule for the selected reasoning rule from
step 2. Go to step 1 to check whether more reasoning can to be done.
Step 4. Check whether communicative acts are received, that is, acts that are
directed to the agent, take the oldest act from the queue of received acts. Go to
step 5 to update the CS accordingly. If the queue of received acts is empty, go to
step 6 to check whether communication is allowed.
Step 5. Execute the appropriate update rule for the selected communicative act
from step 4. Go to step 1 to check whether reasoning can be done.
Step 6. Choose an applicable dialogue rule and go to step 7 to execute this rule.
If there are no applicable rules, go to step 4 to check whether communicative acts
have been received.
1A multi-valued logic allows to represent a lack of belief, partial belief, and inconsistent belief;
these states are used in our dialogue games and therefore need to be represented explicitly.
Step 7. Execute the selected dialogue rule from step 6. Execution has the effect
of uttering a communicative act directed at some other agent. Go to step 8 to
update the CS accordingly.
Step 8. Execute the appropri-
apply rule
apply rule
update CS
update CS
update CS
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Figure 1: The agent’s deliberation cycle.
ate update rule for the uttered
communicative act from step 7.
Go to step 1 to check whether
reasoning can to be done.
The deliberation cycle com-
bined with reasoning and di-
alogue games result in a do-
main independent multi-agent
system. The system is in-
dependent of the agent’s ac-
tual beliefs and desires, as well
as the agents’ use of decision
and communication protocols.
Knowledge can be added to a
MAS in the form of agents, and
in a similar fashion reasoning
and communication protocols
can be added as components to agents.
3 Dialogue Game for Handling Questions
Two agents participate in the following games: unless states otherwise, Sarah is
the speaker and John the listener; denoted with variables s and j respectively.
3.1 Posing Questions
An agent is in the state of being motivated to utter a question when she has an
unbalanced belief and desire state, cf. [1]. Stated differently, if Sarah desires to
believe a proposition ψ, and she does not yet believe ψ, then she has a motive to
utter a question to John whether she may add ψ to her belief state, because answers
to the question may balance her belief and desire state. This communicative act
is called a question for belief addition (qba for short). These two criteria are part
of the pre-conditions of the qba.
(ψ ∈ DsBs), (ψ 6∈ Bs) ∈ pre(qba(s, j, ψ))
The Gricean maxims [2] are principles of cooperative dialogue and provide re-
strictions for uttering acts. These maxims state that utterances of communicative
acts should be informative: i.c. Sarah may not already be aware of John’s answer,
that is, she may ask for ψ if she does not believe that John believes ψ, and that
she does not believe that John is ignorant of ψ.
(ψ 6∈ BsBj), (ψ 6∈ BsIj) ∈ pre(qba(s, j, ψ))
Given the motivation to utter a qba(s, j, ψ), listener John can derive properties
of Sarah’s CS: he may derive that Sarah has the desire to believe ψ, and that she
does not believe ψ; John’s CS should change yielding the following post-conditions.
(ψ ∈ BjDsBs), (ψ ∈ BjIs) ∈ post(qba(s, j, ψ))
In addition, John is aware that Sarah is not aware of his answer; however, these
post-conditions are not used in the dialogue game.
The speaker may assume that for a listener equal post-conditions hold. Con-
sequently, after uttering a qba(s, j, ψ), Sarah may derive that John is aware that
she desires to believe ψ, and that she may be aware that John is aware that she
does not believe ψ. After the utterance, Sarah’s CS has changed according to the
following post-conditions.
(ψ ∈ BsBjDsBs), (ψ ∈ BsBjIs) ∈ post(qba(s, j, ψ))
Communicative acts should be informative, i.e. agents may not utter commu-
nicative acts more than once. To realize this restriction, at least one of the previous
post-condition must not hold. A criterion is added to the set of pre-conditions to
restrict situations in which a question may be uttered.
(ψ 6∈ BsBjDsBs) ∈ pre(qba(s, j, ψ))
3.2 Affirmative Answers to Questions
Apart from giving restrictions, Gricean maxims provide motivations to answer
questions: a question should be answered either affirmative or negative. Sarah is
motivated to respond affirmative to a question from John regarding ψ, if Sarah
believes that John has the desire to believe ψ, and Sarah believes ψ. gqba is short
for granting a question for belief addition.
(ψ ∈ BsDjBj), (ψ ∈ Bs) ∈ pre(gqba(s, j, ψ))
Given the motivation for an affirmative response, listener John may derive
properties of Sarah’s CS. If a gqba(s, j, ψ) is uttered, John may deduce that Sarah
believes ψ, and that Sarah is aware that John desires to believe ψ. Based on the
post-conditions for John’s CS, Sarah’s post-conditions are given next.
(ψ ∈ BjBs), (ψ ∈ BjBsDjBj),
(ψ ∈ BsBjBs), (ψ ∈ BsBjBsDjBj) ∈ post(gqba(s, j, ψ))
To prevent the gqba from being superfluous, Sarah may not be aware she
uttered the act before; she can be sure about this if at least one of her previous
post-conditions does not hold.
(ψ 6∈ BsBjBs) ∈ pre(gqba(s, j, ψ))
3.3 Posing Counter-Questions
Counter-questions are questions about propositions that are related to other propo-
sitions that agents desire to believe. These questions are syntactically indistin-
guishable from the question defined in Section 3.1. However, counter-questions are
different communicative acts from a semantic perspective: they have a different
motivation; nevertheless, post-conditions and other pre-conditions are no different
from the ordinary question. To differentiate between questions, counter-questions
are indexed 2 and 3.
Sarah is motivated to utter counter-question 2 regarding ψ, if she desires to
believe ϕ, she does not believe ϕ, and adding ψ to her belief base results in believing
ϕ. Addition to a belief state is adding a proposition set theoretically and taking
the closure (Cn) under a set of deduction rules2, for details, see [3].
(ϕ ∈ DsBs), (ϕ 6∈ Bs), (ϕ ∈ Cn(Bs ∪ {ψ})) ∈ pre(qba2(s, j, ψ))
Sarah is motivated to utter a counter-question 3 regarding ψ, if she is aware
that John desires to believe ϕ, she is not aware that John believes ϕ, and she does
not herself believe ϕ, however, adding ψ to her belief state results in believing ϕ,
then we necessarily have ψ 6∈ Bs.
(ϕ ∈ BsDjBj), (ϕ 6∈ BsBj), (ϕ 6∈ Bs),
(ϕ ∈ Cn(Bs ∪ {ψ})) ∈ pre(qba3(s, j, ψ))
Note that only motivations are presented and that the other pre-conditions
of a qba are also applicable. Also note that these counter-questions create new
enquiry dialogues that are related to existing dialogues; initial unbalanced belief-
desire pairs introduce new unbalanced pairs which results in distributed enquiry
yielding a distributed solution.
3.4 Negative Answers to Questions
Sarah is motivated to utter a negative response to a question from John regarding
ψ, if she believes that John has the desire to believe ψ, she does not believe ψ, and
she ran out of options i.c. counter-questions to help him. The formal treatment
of the last pre-condition is left out due to lack of space. dqba is short for denying
a question for belief addition.
(ψ ∈ BsDjBj), (ψ 6∈ Bs) ∈ pre(dqba(s, j, ψ))
Listener John may derive properties of Sarah’s CS from the motivations of a
dqba(x, y, ψ). Sarah may derive properties of John’s CS.
(ψ ∈ BjBsDjBj), (ψ ∈ BjIs),
(ψ ∈ BsBjBsDjBj), (ψ ∈ BsBjIs) ∈ post(dqba(s, j, ψ))
To prevent that the dqba is superfluous, at least one of Sarah’s post-conditions
must not hold.
(ψ 6∈ BsBjIs) ∈ pre(dqba(s, j, ψ))
2We only use R3: If ψ ϕ ∈ Bs and ψ ∈ Bs then also ϕ ∈ Bs.
3.5 Dialogue and Update Rules
Dialogue rules prescribe which communicative acts agents are allowed to utter
given their CS’s. A dialogue rule for a communicative act λ states that if all
criteria in the set of pre-conditions of λ hold according to the agent’s CS, then the
rule may be executed by the agent, that is, λ may be uttered. Update rules define
the contents of an agent’s CS after λ is uttered or received. Update rules states
that if λ is received by an agent, then the post-conditions of λ hold for that agent.
Dialogue games consist of these rules.
We analysed dialogue games for desirable properties such as termination, con-
fluence, or whether unbalanced belief-desire states are resolved in the terminating
CS’s. The dialogue game for handling questions is proven to be terminating, and
confluent for belief states with term rewriting systems [5] (proofs not presented).
Termination property is essential in the deliberation cycle: if it is violated decisions
may never be made and communicative acts may never be uttered due to eternal
cycling. Confluence makes the choice of dialogue rule in step 1 unimportant from
a semantic point of view which allows straightforward implementation.
3.6 Other Communication Protocols
Another communication protocols concern offering of beliefs, i.e. requesting agents
to add propositions to their belief states. Offering propositions has the intended
effect of the propositions being part of the listeners’ belief states, opposed to
questions which have the intended effect of propositions being part of the speakers’
belief states. The motivation to utter an offering of belief addition (oba for short)
is given next, the dialogue game is elaborated in Lebbink et al. [4].
(ψ ∈ DsBj), (ψ 6∈ BsBj) ∈ pre(oba(s, j, ψ))
Protocols for belief retraction can be given in a similar fashion: a question for
belief retraction (qbr for short) directed at John is motivated when Sarah has the
desire to be ignorant about ψ and she believes ψ.
(ψ ∈ DsIs), (ψ ∈ Bs) ∈ pre(qbr(s, j, ψ))
A request for a belief retraction (rbr for short) directed at John is motivated
when Sarah has the desire that John is to be ignorant about ψ, and she is not
aware that John is ignorant about ψ.
(ψ ∈ DsIj), (ψ 6∈ BsIj) ∈ pre(rbr(s, j, ψ))
Special care must be taken that introducing other games does not break ter-
mination properties of existing games.
4 Reasoning Game for Believing
Our objective is to propose a programming approach to MAS development with
dialogue games. These dialogue games presuppose reasoning rules defining when
agents are allowed to accept to believe propositions, i.c. when questions for belief
addition are answered affirmative.
4.1 Protocol for Deciding to Believe Propositions
The agent’s reasoning processes are based on her private beliefs, desires and her
beliefs of other agents’ mental states. Similar to the semantics of communicative
acts, the agents’ decisions to add propositions to their belief states are sets of
criteria that need to hold in their current CS’s. We use a simple conformism
protocol. Sarah is allowed to add ψ to her belief state, if she believes that John
believes ψ, and she does not believe ψ itself. ba is short for belief addition.
(ψ ∈ BsBj), (ψ 6∈ Bs) ∈ pre(ba(s, ψ))
The effects of the ba is that Sarah believes the propositions.
(ψ ∈ Bs) ∈ post(ba(s, ψ))
Other criteria may restrict the ba to add only those beliefs that have a purpose,
i.c. contribute to balance belief-desire pairs, or add only those beliefs coming from
an authority, like users or sensors, but this is beyond the scope of the paper.
Reasoning rules and associated update rules are defined like dialogue rules.
Similar issues for termination and confluence hold for reasoning games.
4.2 Other Reasoning Protocols
Other reasoning protocols may concern agents becoming aware that they have
irresolvable disagreements and that they want to agree to disagree [4]. Yet an-
other protocol may define when agents are allowed to forget beliefs, i.e. remove
propositions from their belief state. br is short for belief retraction.
(ψ ∈ Bs), (∀j ∈ A (ψ ∈ BsIj)) ∈ pre(br(s, ψ))
This protocol will interfere with the protocol for belief addition; future research
centres on the question what a protocol for retraction should look like that if it is
to work with a protocol for belief addition. Agents performing belief revision in a
distributed fashion could be implemented with these reasoning protocols.
5 Implementation and Conclusions
The agents’ CS’s, dialogue and reasoning games, and the deliberation cycle are
implemented in SWI-Prolog [6] resulting in a multi-agent implementation. For
every mental state a separate Prolog engine with database is created that captures
the state of an agent. The database is used to store the propositions part of the
mental state. Engines with databases are called ‘modules’ in SWI-Prolog and are
used in the following fashion: e.g. mc(b(s)) is the identifier for Sarah’s belief
state. Reasoning and dialogue rules are implemented by taking the pre-conditions
of decisions and communicative acts as the body of Prolog clause. Update rules for
listener and speaker are the actions of asserting propositions if they were not yet
present in the modules. The dialogue rule to utter a qba, and the corresponding
update rules are implemented in Figure 2. Reasoning rules are implemented in
analogous fashion. Preliminary tests have been performed with up to 40 agents
resulting in good performance.
Dialogue and reasoning games dialogue_rule(qba(S, J, Prop)) :-
mc(d(S), b(S)):Prop,
mc(b(S)):not Prop,
mc(b(S), b(J)):not Prop,
mc(b(S), i(J)):not Prop,
mc(b(S), b(J), d(S), b(S)):not Prop.
update_listener(qba(S, J, Prop)) :-
add(mc(b(J), d(S), b(S)), Prop),
add(mc(b(J), i(S), b(J)), Prop),
update_speaker(qba(S, J, Prop)) :-
add(mc(b(S), b(J), d(S), b(S)), Prop),
add(mc(b(S), b(J), i(S)), Prop).
add(Prop, MC) :-
MC:not Prop -> MC:assert(Prop); true.
Figure 2: Prolog listings.
are implemented enabling agents
to communicate and make deci-
sions. The semantics of commu-
nicative acts and decisions are de-
fined by formulating the rules of us-
age, being pre-conditions that need
to hold in the speaker’s or reasoning
agent’s CS, and post-conditions that
need to hold when communicative
acts are uttered or decisions made.
The agent’s ability to utter counter-
questions results in distributed en-
quiry and a distributed answer. Dif-
ferent dialogue games and reasoning
games can be deployed for different
tasks, like problem solving or belief revision. Confluence of the dialogue game
for question handling makes the order of permissible communicative act utter-
ance unimportant. And termination property states that answers to questions (if
any) are found. Tests resulted in good performance providing an indication in the
feasibility of the programming approach.
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